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The main thesis of this paper is that two prevailing theories about cognitive penetration
are too extreme, namely, the view that cognitive penetration is pervasive and the view
that there is a sharp and fundamental distinction between cognition and perception,
which precludes any type of cognitive penetration. These opposite views have clear
merits and empirical support. To eliminate this puzzling situation, we present an
alternative theoretical approach that incorporates the merits of these views into a
broader and more nuanced explanatory framework. A key argument we present in favor
of this framework concerns the evolution of intentionality and perceptual capacities. An
implication of this argument is that cases of cognitive penetration must have evolved
more recently and that this is compatible with the cognitive impenetrability of early
perceptual stages of processing information. A theoretical approach that explains why
this should be the case is the consciousness and attention dissociation framework. The
paper discusses why concepts, particularly issues concerning concept acquisition, play
an important role in the interaction between perception and cognition.
Keywords: cognitive penetrability, consciousness, visual attention, evolution, dissociation, language, concept
acquisition
INTRODUCTION: EVOLUTIONARY ARGUMENTS FOR A
PERCEPTION AND COGNITION INTERFACE
This paper critically assesses the view that there are systematic and robust influences from
cognition on perception at the early stages of processing, which could be considered cases of
cognitive penetration. While we agree with the criticisms that there are empirical “pitfalls” in
the experiments allegedly reporting cognitive penetration (see Firestone and Scholl, 2016), there
also are difficulties regarding the view that there is a sharp distinction between perception
(the processing of sensory information that occurs at several levels) and cognition (the judging
of representational contents related to reasoning). Besides being problematic theoretically, the
assumption that a sharp distinction between all cognition and all perception must be an essential
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aspect of the mind may even be empirically false. The
criticisms around the notion of penetrability need to be more
balanced so that it accounts for an architecture consisting of
some cognitively impenetrable modules (characteristic of early
perception) along with others that are susceptible to top-down
influences (characteristic of late perception). Such varied effects
must be available in perception to understand abilities such as
predictive coding and conceptual attention.
We focus on concept acquisition to explain the interface
between cognitively penetrable perception and cognitively
impenetrable perception, and particularly on the fact that concept
acquisition is also a perceptual, rather than a strictly cognitive
process involving only reasoning or judgment. Even if the brain’s
architecture is organized in a modular and encapsulated way,
there can still be a conceptual interface between perception
and cognition. It is at this conceptual interface, which is also
responsible for explicit or discursive judgment and inference,
where most interactions between perception and cognition will
occur that can contain instances of cognitive penetration. We
will explore the issue of concept acquisition at different stages
of processing and explain how it relates to top-down pre-cueing.
This relation will reinforce our point that a balanced combination
of any possible cognitive penetrability and early impenetrability
is critical. In fact, we aim to show that conceptual interfaces
between cognition and perception are crucial for understanding
how our species developed sophisticated forms of attention.
One approach to achieve this balanced interface perspective
is based on the consciousness and attention dissociation (CAD)
framework (Montemayor and Haladjian, 2015). This framework
characterizes the relationship between consciousness and
attention, and claims that attention is significantly dissociated
from consciousness, with different levels of interactions between
attention and conscious awareness. This distinction is important
because there is abundant evidence of cognitive effects on
attention without conscious awareness—an unconscious form of
cognitive guidance—as well as cases in which motivational states
guide implicitly, sometimes against the conscious judgments
of subjects, as in cases of implicit bias (see Montemayor and
Haladjian, 2015, for a discussion of the evidence in vision). These
cases of guidance and selection in perception may be conceived
as attention routines, and many will be independent, and even
disagree, with conscious perception. Crucially, for the topic of
cognitive penetration, CAD allows for the systematic guidance
of late perception by cognitively driven attention, while also
allowing for the cognitive impenetrability of early perception.
These different types of guidance and influence on late
perception (voluntary and involuntary, conscious and
unconscious) help clarify some problems concerning extant
discussions on cognitive penetration. Some alleged cases of
cognitive penetration may readily be excluded, for instance cases
of explicit voluntary judgment on perceptual contents that are
not even indirectly influenced by beliefs or discursive inference.
Some motivational and emotional forms of guidance are more
problematic, as they typically occur independently of explicit
propositional attitudes, although they can easily be understood as
part of the attentional guidance on late perception. But it seems
that if all implicit forms of motivational and cognitive guidance
are excluded, as defended by the sharp delineation view, then
it is too easy to conclude that perception is never penetrable
by cognition. We will resist this conclusion by arguing that it
is an implausible view of the complexity of perception—and
of its evolution. We will also argue against the opposite view
that cognitive penetration is widespread, as some proponents
of cognitive penetrability propose. Some forms of perception,
specifically early perceptual processing, must be impenetrable.
The problem is one of balance: there must be systematic forms
of influence on perception without major disturbances to the
evolutionarily developed and required perceptual invariances
for successful navigation and motor control. The dissociation
between consciousness and attention provides this more nuanced
theoretical approach, and it advances the debate beyond the strict
dichotomy between cognition and perception.
In addition, the CAD framework is particularly well suited to
address cognitive penetration because it is supported by a vast
amount of findings, specifically in vision science (Montemayor
and Haladjian, 2015). The ‘early versus late perception’
distinction was introduced in order to interpret findings in vision
science. Early visual perception includes sensory processes that
are specialized for handling specific types of information used in
constructing representations independently of beliefs (Pylyshyn,
1999). Late perception involves selective processing by top-down
attention and other cognitive processes (Raftopoulos, 2015b). Just
like this distinction generalizes to other perceptual modalities
and to the more general distinction between cognition and
perception, CAD also generalizes to all kinds of dissociations
between subjectively conscious experience and attention routines
that do not necessitate conscious awareness, including emotions
and memory. The central tenet of the CAD framework is
that there must be some dissociation between attention and
phenomenal consciousness (subjective experience) with some
extant theories indicating a high degree of dissociation. Thus,
CAD is a framework to better understand, model, and integrate
findings and theories on consciousness and attention based on
how they are dissociated from each other. In this paper we present
the implications of CAD for the topic of cognitive penetration.
The crucial argument we make in support of these claims
concerns evolution. Also based on the CAD framework, the
argument is as follows.
(a) Perceptual systems evolved from basic to complex forms
of processing, and some are less cognitively penetrable
than others (e.g., early perceptual stages are cognitively
impenetrable).
(b) Perceptual states produced by such systems can be defined
in terms of intentionality (the way in which mental
representations are about things and features in the world):
perception is always about features of the environment that
can in principle be interpreted propositionally (although
they need not be propositional to be intentional).
(c) If perceptual systems evolved, then intentionality also
evolved.
Therefore, some forms of intentionality are more cognitively
penetrable than others, and an interface for penetrability is needed
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for concept acquisition and global access (including access to
propositional content).
This argument shows why evolution matters to the debate on
cognitive penetration, and why penetrability is more complicated
than previously thought. CAD can help explain the relationship
between cognition and perception, and indicate where cases of
penetrability may occur. For instance, one possibility is that
there may need to be two interfaces between cognition and
perception, one concerning phenomenally conscious experiences
and another concerning non-phenomenally conscious perceptual
contents. Such interfaces will be critical for all kinds of conceptual
and pre-conceptual learning that guide attention routines.
A discussion about what is meant by ‘cognitive penetration’ is
required to fully understand the implications of this argument. By
‘cognitive penetration’ most authors intend a general category of
cognitive influences on how perceptual information is processed
by sensory mechanisms, which includes cases in which the beliefs
and desires of perceivers somehow determine what they perceive.
This of course can be interpreted in many ways. The demarcation
between cognitively penetrable and impenetrable perception was
originally proposed to understand cognitive architecture, but it
now encompasses cases in which top-down attention influences
bottom-up early attention routines, independently of specific
commitments regarding architecture (Vetter and Newen, 2014).
As mentioned, views at one end of the possible degrees of
penetrability deny that cognitive penetration captures a truly
unique type of influence of cognition on perceptual processing
(e.g., Firestone and Scholl, 2016). Such views would never
consider systematic influences of cognition on perception as
legitimate cases of cognitive penetration. On the other hand,
views that state that there is no boundary between cognition
and perception deny that cognition could be dissociated from
perception (e.g., Clark, 2013).
Thus, a critical issue is how to clearly specify legitimate
cases of cognitive penetration—cases in which the influence
of cognition on perception is not trivial or easily explained
by appeal to inference (Firestone and Scholl, 2016), or some
other cognitive process such as judgment or interpretation. This
becomes especially important when authors arguing for the
case of penetrability do this by giving examples of changes to
higher levels in perception, those that are beyond the initial
stages of sensory processing. For example, some findings indicate
that throughout the stages of perceptual processing there are
both forward and backward neural projections that contribute
to perception (e.g., Vetter and Newen, 2014). Yet, these do
not necessarily indicate that early perception is penetrable by
cognition. We argue that the more interesting cases of cognitive
penetration would not be at the higher level of perceptual
judgment or the interpretation of the output from sensory
processing. Nor would they be cases where voluntary attention
simply changes the perceptual stimulus or input (e.g., looking to
the left based on my desire to change my gaze should not count
as a case of cognitive penetration). Radical cases of penetrability
would influence perceptual processing directly at early stages, and
not simply at a higher attentive (or cognitive) level.
More specifically, the most problematic form of cognitive
penetration would have to occur at the level of processing called
‘early vision’ or early perception more generally (see Pylyshyn,
1999). Instances of radical cognitive penetrability should show
that perception, particularly early perception, cannot “resist” the
influence of content coming from inferences, beliefs, or desires.
This could happen quite selectively: not all beliefs and desires
can directly affect perception, but only some specific ones in
specific situations. What is crucial is that if radical cognitive
penetration exists, then there is the possibility of causal influences
from cognition that directly modify perception, even when all else
is being equal at the sensory input level, including how attention
is being allocated. This causal influence must explain directly
how early perception is processed—otherwise, purely conceptual
influences could explain cognitive penetration (see Raftopoulos,
2014, pp. 605–606 for discussion). We shall argue against this
radical form of cognitive penetration.
Cognitive penetration is a crucial topic in philosophy of
perception because of how it relates to controversial issues in
epistemology or the theory of knowledge. For instance, there is
the view that the contents of perception are propositional (i.e.,
they have truth conditions, just like the propositions expressed
by sentences), and that perception is akin to belief—a kind of
propositional attitude (Byrne, 2005). There is also the view that
perception need not have propositional content (Crane, 2009).
This issue is clearly related to the topic of non-conceptual content
in perception. In these debates, it is generally taken for granted
that the focus of analysis is perceptual conscious experience.
But CAD shows this is an assumption that should not be taken
for granted because what is true about phenomenally conscious
perception need not be true about perception in general—
there are types of non-phenomenally conscious perception as
in blindsight (e.g., see Kentridge, 2011). More important, CAD
explains why these apparently opposite views could be true about
different types of perception—one cognitively penetrable at the
propositional, later perceptual level and the other cognitively
impenetrable at the non-conceptual, early perceptual level. As we
argue below, this is actually a consequence of the argument from
evolution.
To illustrate the importance of CAD to understand different
types of cognitive impenetrability, consider the most basic kind of
conscious experience, for instance of color. One possibility CAD
allows for is that early color perception is experienced in the exact
same way as in other organisms that lack the top-down routines
dependent on cognitive capacities. This possibility plays a major
role in motivating the notion of phenomenal consciousness,
particularly for “first order” theorists, who deny that experiences
must be part of a thought or representation for them to be
conscious. This approach suggests that many species, certainly
mammals, must have phenomenal experiences that are analogous
to human phenomenal consciousness. For such overlap in
experiences of color, it seems necessary to adopt the view that
early vision color is impenetrable (for dissent see Macpherson,
2012). So what about color perception that is processed at
the interface with working memory, conceptual categorization,
and motivational guidance (e.g., perceptually judging the typical
color of an object or evaluating the beauty of a combination
of colors)? At this level, it is clear that color perception would
be susceptible to different kinds of top-down effects, and these
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could count as cognitive penetration at later stages of processing.
In humans, these two types of perceptual processing come
apart, and only CAD makes sense of this possibility: conscious
early (bottom-up) vision without top-down attention modulation
and conceptualized color detection, susceptible to cognitive and
motivational modulation. An intriguing possibility, entailed by
the argument from evolution, is that some animals experience
color in a modular, and more encapsulated way, because they lack
the conceptual interfaces required for late perceptual modulation
and judgment.
The consciousness and attention dissociation thus helps us
understand the cognitive impenetrability of early perceptual
processes, without maintaining that there is no room for
cognitive penetrability at more integrated levels of perception
and cognition, in a way that generates an interaction between
these levels. It also facilitates the theoretical characterization
of cognitive influences on unconscious perception that play no
role in conscious experience, and vice versa. Combined with
the argument from evolution, CAD justifies the impenetrability
of early perception based on the importance of perceptual
invariances to navigate the environment, for example, which
must have evolved early on, independently of cognitive and
motivational influences. It is precisely because different kinds
of intentionality evolved at different times that there must be
interfaces between perception and cognition, some of which need
not be fully fledged conceptual inference. This is why processes
involved in concept acquisition are relevant for striking a balance
between the ‘pervasive cognitive penetration’ and ‘no cognitive
penetration’ views.
Like any theoretical category, that of ‘early vision’ (which can
be extended to early perception) has fuzzy boundaries. There is
agreement, however, that early vision must include modularly
specific (cognitively impenetrable) feature detection, such as
color, motion, or orientation, typically before the involvement
of working memory. It may also involve objecthood, without
the cognitive imprint of conceptual categories. One may say
that at the very first stages of perception, there is sentience
of phenomenally experienced features, structured spatially and
temporally, which can be cross-modally integrated by feature
maps. This processing must preserve external invariances
concerning light reflectance, shape, distance, and duration
(among many other invariances that allow for reliably accurate
navigation and coordinated motor control). In this sense,
perceptual invariances are preserved by cognitive impenetrability
from motivational and conceptual attention modulation (at least
in humans). The later involvement of working memory allows
for such cognitive and emotional modulation, and what was
consciously experienced without the imprint of categorization is
now experienced under a conceptual or motivational influence
or category. This cognitive transition has implications for how to
understand perception in other species and also with respect to
the evolution of our own perceptual system. This is one of the
reasons why CAD and the argument from evolution must inform
our understanding of cognitive penetration.
Based on these considerations, it seems that there are two
kinds of cognitive impenetrability: phenomenally conscious
(basic feature perception) and non-phenomenally conscious
(feature detection outside of awareness). Likewise, there might
be two kinds of cognitive penetrability, one phenomenal
(motivational influences on perception) and the other non-
phenomenal (conceptual influences in blindsight-like detection).
Once conceptual capacities are in the picture, however, one can
always interpret perceptual contents by providing a propositional
explanation or interpretation. Consider the contrast between
explaining and directly causing the contents of perception. In
typical cases of automatic or effortless inference, you can infer
that someone is late by looking at their facial expression or how
they are looking at their watch, but this does not mean that you
are seeing “lateness.” Emotion perception is more complicated,
but it might be susceptible to similar interpretative treatments
(for dissent, see Siegel, 2006; Newen and Vetter, 2017). We can
infer someone’s joy through their facial expressions, but we do
not necessarily see the actual feeling of joy. In this sense, inference
can influence what someone perceives without changing radically
how the visual system perceives environmental features, which
would remain impenetrable. What causes the contents of
perception at early stages remains untouched by top-down
modulation.
Such inferential influences could be implicit and not depend
on any kind of voluntary guidance. The notion of ‘inference’
is flexible enough that it could occur at all stages of perceptual
predictive processing in perception (see Clark, 2013), where
such processing can be influenced by the statistical properties
of experiences or contexts (e.g., see Yuille and Kersten, 2006).
This more flexible notion seems to problematize the distinction
between impenetrable and penetrable perception, but once the
CAD framework is in place, one can argue, based partly on
the argument from evolution, that early perceptual statistical
processing need not be considered susceptible of any top-
down influence. Such probabilistic information about perceptual
properties is compatible with encapsulation (Raftopoulos,
2015a).
A critical point that deserves emphasis is that cognitive
penetration should not jeopardize the stable invariances of
perception. This constraint is particularly important for results
that aim to show putative forms of penetrability concerning
basic information for navigation, such as information concerning
distance and depth. If penetration occurs in these cases, it must
be shown that they are not pervasive to the degree that someone
who is simply walking out of a room would be disoriented
by the changes in size, distance, and depth that are based on
her beliefs and desires. If cognitive penetration entailed this
kind of disruption of basic perceptual invariances, then such
cases of penetrability would be just as disorienting, if not more
disorienting, than hallucinations. Typically, hallucinations are
explained in terms of changes in physiology (e.g., a deliberate
neurophysiological change caused by ingesting certain drugs),
rather than simple changes in belief and desire. Thus, an
important constraint is that cognitive penetration should not
be conceived in ways that would entail radical alterations
to perception, analogous to those caused by physiology from
external sources. Perception (e.g., early vision) must preserve
invariances reliably. For truly radical cognitive penetration
to occur, there must be evidence that top-down conceptual
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information influences the early stages of visual perception
beyond simply facilitating the processing of visual information
(e.g., attentional effects) (Raftopoulos, 2015b).
As mentioned, another important consideration is the notion
of intentionality (i.e., the way in which mental representations
are about things and features in the world) and how evolution
can explain it. Intentionality may be very basic, processed in
a modular fashion, and responsive to immediate information
from the environment, or it can be more abstract, categorical,
and influenced by judgments and inferences. Various forms
of intentionality will correspond to the evolutionary record
of such capacities, as well as how widespread they are across
species (the earlier, the more widespread). Intentionality will
require a conceptual interface at some level, at least in humans,
especially when faced with novel stimuli or situations that
demand categorization. It is this area of conceptual development
that requires scrutiny in terms of potential interfaces for cognitive
penetrability of late perceptual stages of processing.
Concept acquisition of perceptual categories, we propose, is
the best example of why an interface between perception and
cognition is needed. Interesting cases of cognitive penetration
could be defined in terms of such interfaces concerning
concept acquisition, and this is the strategy we follow here. An
important question is whether there are pre-cuing effects on
concept acquisition. Since pre-cueing determines how attention
is allocated and can change the background neural activity
in a way that helps determine what is perceived, it may also
determine or bias how a concept is obtained or categorized
through perception. The relation between categorical reasoning
and categorical capacities based on what ethologists call ‘fixed
action patterns’ is one that deserves attention in this regard.
A thorough evaluation of the evolution of intentionality across
different species should include an examination of pre-cuing
effects on these proto-conceptual intentional representations.
DEFINING AN INTERFACE FOR
COGNITIVE PENETRATION THAT DOES
NOT JEOPARDIZE EARLY PERCEPTION
A more essential starting point is to define what is meant
by perception and cognition. Perception is the processing
of external information by the sensory systems, such as
visual or auditory information. It has various stages, and can
be broadly categorized between early perception, which is
comprised of encapsulated sensory processing modules (e.g., see
Pylyshyn, 1999; Raftopoulos, 2015b), and late perception, which
includes multi-modal integration, event perception, and object
recognition (e.g., see Cavanagh, 2011). Perceptual information
processing often leads to the subjective experience of that
information, for example, of seeing an object or hearing a
sound. Yet sensory processing does not need to enter conscious
awareness to be perceptually registered—a lot of it can happen
in the background. Importantly, perception is considered to be
essentially a “belief-independent” process (particularly the early
kind). A key question, notoriously difficult in epistemology,
is how can such belief-independent processes justify beliefs?
Again, this issue concerns the interface between perception and
cognition.
When I see an apple, for example, my visual system is
processing information about the features of this object, but
how exactly is such processing related to the justification of my
belief that I am seeing an apple? If all I perceive is shape and
color then the justification of my belief is mostly independent
of perception and it must be some kind of inference. But there
is no problem in saying that I see an apple (or that I see an
object as an apple), and that what I see justifies my beliefs because
of the top-down modulation of concepts. This is compatible
with the encapsulation of color and shape perception, and CAD
is particularly helpful in explaining how this is possible. This
helps solve the problem of how epistemically unjustified early
processing gives rise to perceptually justified beliefs by the top-
down influences of concepts on late perception.
Cognition involves more deliberate modulation by top-down
processes, like using focused attention to search for a specific
object, and includes action-planning, self-reflection, and abilities
related to language. All of these processes are closely linked
to consciousness and propositional content (specifically the so-
called ‘access consciousness’—Block, 1995). These processes are
generally epistemic, but they can also include more complex
forms of cognition and conscious experience, like aesthetic
and moral judgments. The implication of radical cognitive
penetration is that such goal-oriented higher-level processes can
directly affect the way in which information is initially processed
by sensory systems such that it affects feature detection (e.g., the
color of the object to be found). We shall argue that they can only
alter them indirectly, by the modulation of late perception.
The question at issue is just how much can cognition affect
low-level perceptual processes? Will this be a form of pre-
cueing that simply directs impenetrable modules and routines, or
does it actually affect the processing of perceptual information
within the module (beyond attentional effects)? Is any aspect
of low-level perception truly cognitively penetrable? Given the
constraints mentioned above, as well as the argument from
evolution, the answer is that cognitive penetration cannot be
pervasive, and if it happens, it has to happen at the right
level (e.g., late perception, after the intervention of at least
working memory) so that perceptual invariances are not affected
and basic abilities necessary for survival, such as navigation,
are possible. To reiterate, early perception is not likely to be
susceptible of any kind of cognitive penetration. One possibility,
compatible with CAD, is that access conscious penetration
of perception may occur without phenomenally conscious
penetration on early perceptual experiences and vice versa. With
respect to phenomenal consciousness, a similar distinction is
unproblematic: early phenomenal conscious vision may be non-
conceptual and then phenomenal concepts are deployed to
categorize experiences (see Loar, 1997).
As mentioned, some authors argue that cognitive penetration
never genuinely occurs. Instead, what falls under the category
of “penetration” is judgment or cognition, and it never affects
perception as such (see Firestone and Scholl, 2016). Other authors
defend the view that cognitive penetration affects perception in
all sorts of ways, such that belief systematically alters perception
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(e.g., Siegel, 2006, 2010; Stokes, 2012). This is argued to occur
even at the earliest stages of processing. Given the amount of top-
down influence on perceptual processing on a neural level (e.g.,
see Gilbert and Li, 2013; Vetter and Newen, 2014), this view is not
implausible. According to this pervasive-penetrability view, our
beliefs, desires, and goals affect perception in multiple ways. What
we perceive, therefore, is susceptible to a vast array of cognitive
influences.
The pervasive-penetrability view presents a difficult challenge.
If cognitive penetration always and systematically occurs,
perception would inform us almost always about what we already
believe or feel, instead of informing us about features of the world
(particularly when we encounter novel objects or events). This is
a problem that is especially worrisome for epistemology (Stokes,
2012). Clearly, there would need to be varieties of perceptual
penetration with varying degrees of penetrability. If experiences
are analogous to beliefs in the sense that they require critical
judgment and justification, then one must reflect on, as well as
systematically analyze, what one perceives. This reflective analysis
would constitute an effortful and highly top-down form of
attention (perhaps even effortful voluntary attention to explicitly
judged perceptual contents). Problematically, such a belief-based
attentive process would need to dominate all other forms of
perceptual attention for pervasive penetration to occur.
The consciousness and attention dissociation and the
argument from evolution offer a way out of this challenge.
It could be that cognitive penetration only affects access
consciousness (i.e., access to information available for thought,
memory, and action, but without subjective experience) at
higher levels of cognitive integration. All effects of cognition
on perceptual experiences can be explained by appeal to
concepts, beliefs, or inferences, and perceptual contents
remain impenetrable at the early stages. It could be, therefore,
that top-down attention routines operate independently
from phenomenally conscious perception. Motivational
effects may be explained at higher levels of integration,
which need not modify the contents of early phenomenally
conscious perception. The forms of perceptual experience
that evolved early, such as experiences of color, would be
impenetrable. This theoretical possibility would solve the
epistemic problem presented above. CAD could also explain
why the pervasive penetration of conceptualized contents in
access consciousness need not entail the pervasive penetration
of phenomenally conscious perception (subjectively experienced
perception).
There are, however, good reasons to believe that the view at
the other extreme that rejects any form of penetrability is also
too radical. For example, social interactions require perceptual
processing and an understanding of the situational context
(including other agents) in order to succeed. Categorizing new
objects, events, or situations also requires a level of cognitive
influence that may depend on previous experience or knowledge.
The view of perception as Bayesian inference, for example,
presents models of how perception can be constrained by prior
experience, biasing detection of more likely features and limiting
the possible interpretations of this information (e.g., see Kersten
et al., 2004; Yuille and Kersten, 2006). Although we would argue
that this sort of biasing is not a form of cognitive penetration
of early perceptual processing, it can influence how this
processing occurs and particularly influence how the contents
of perception are interpreted. Such reasons exemplify why there
must be an interface for cognitive penetration. These would be
epistemically fundamental cases of cognitive penetration at later
stages of perception, where the cognitive integration of emotion,
cognition, and perception is at work. Here we try to strike a
balance between these opposite views by appealing to the CAD
framework and the argument from evolution (see Haladjian and
Montemayor, 2015). A more nuanced view is required not only
to solve the epistemic problem mentioned above, but also to
achieve a comprehensive theory of perception that accounts for
the epistemic and motivational significance of perception, and the
Bayesian approach is particularly helpful here.
How exactly should the evolution of intentionality be
understood, particularly with respect to CAD and cognitive
impenetrability? One possibility is that humans and other species
share many forms of early perception, with non-conceptual
intentional content, which could be understood in terms of
Peacocke’s (1992) account of “scenario content.” As Crane
(2009) clarifies, such scenario content must be interpreted
in terms of being in a state with non-conceptual content—a
representational state such that being in it does not require the
possession of concepts—even though such contents could be
properly characterized by concepts by a creature with conceptual
capacities, such as humans. We cannot be certain about how
animals experience such contents, but it is highly likely that
they must have similar experiences. Animals navigate, identify
objects, react to color, and have similar sensorial systems. At
some point in our evolution, our brains created routines to
cognitively guide attention, but these routines cannot directly
change early perception due to the requirement of feature
constancy for survival, which includes features such as color
and time (Lisi and Gorea, 2016). Then, even later in our
evolution, we learned to explicitly interpret our perceptual
experiences and to linguistically articulate such interpretations
in terms of discursive inference (a capacity that seems to be
exclusively human). Thus, genuine cases of cognitive penetration
should not appeal to explicit inference, as when one “sees” that
someone is late. But perception at higher levels of cognitive
integration (e.g., above early vision) may present interesting
cases of cognitive penetration by conceptualization. This would
leave early processing encapsulated and impenetrable, and it
would also open the door to interfaces between preconceptual
perception and cognitively guided, conceptual perception.
Forms of cognitive integration also evolved, and they matter
for the way in which perceptual contents are processed. For
example, the cross-modal integration of information (e.g.,
auditory and visual) can indicate influences from one modality on
another when attention is directed in a certain way (e.g., Palmer
and Ramsey, 2012). Such cross-modal integration is often, though
not always, related to conscious experience, with some theories
of consciousness relying on the integration of information
from multiple sources to produce the unified experience of
consciousness (e.g., Tononi, 2012). This multi-level approach
could help model possible forms of cognitive integration in
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terms of different interfaces that evolved at different times.
Early perception remains impenetrable to guarantee stability,
but in the course of evolution, contents are accessed and
integrated, without affecting early perception. Then memory
and motivational systems are also integrated into more complex
cognitive states, guided by cognitively driven attention.
Early perceptual processes must, above all, provide reliable
information about the environment independently of motivation
or cognitive modulation. They include feature-based and
object-based attention (Treisman, 1988), and motion tracking
mechanisms (Pylyshyn, 1989; Cavanagh et al., 2001). Top-
down pre-cuing and cognitive guidance operate at higher levels,
after early selection mechanisms of attention have occurred
(Yeh and Chen, 1999; Theeuwes, 2010). Thus, early vision
provides a basic realm of perceptual experiences that inform
navigation, immediate engagement with the environment, and
even forms of planning that can be found in other species,
such as birds (Clayton and Dickinson, 1998). As mentioned,
this form of intentionality may be understood in terms of
the notion of ‘scenario content’—an intentional state that
need not be constituted either by concepts or propositional
contents for it to be representational. Navigation in many
species seems to demand this kind of intentionality and it
must have evolved early (for discussion on how this topic
relates to the distinction between analog and digital formats of
mental representation, see Montemayor, 2013, chapter 3). It is
very likely that in creatures with phenomenal consciousness,
scenario content is deeply linked to basic experiences that
inform them about the environment much in the same
way as they inform us. Although many skillful reactions
to the environment occur outside phenomenal consciousness,
conscious experience is our most immediate guide for action.
Access to content, on the other hand, requires higher levels of
integration and the intervention of propositional attitudes, such
as beliefs.
There is a related issue concerning how attention works
outside conscious awareness in species that may not have
phenomenal consciousness. Non-human species with complex
attentive systems, such as dragonflies (Wiederman and O’Carroll,
2013), are also not likely to access navigational information
propositionally (in terms of access consciousness and conceptual
judgment). Here CAD presents an interesting possibility. Perhaps
those attention capacities for navigation and object tracking
in species like insects are extensionally equivalent to those of
organisms that rely on phenomenal consciousness (they overlap
in terms of their reference and how the organism reacts to
stimuli). But for such extensional overlap to be possible, these
early perceptual processes must be impenetrable, or at the
very least, the impenetrability of such perceptual processes is
the best explanation we have for their overlap across species.
Obviously, understanding exactly how much perceptual guidance
happens outside conscious awareness is an empirical issue.
The claim we defend here is that the distinction between
cognitively impenetrable perception and cognitive penetration is
fundamental to account for the complexity of perception and its
evolution. The challenge is to understand the relation between
cognitively impenetrable perception and cognitively penetrable
perception. To this end, we now proceed to discuss concept
acquisition—one of the clearest instances in which an interface
between cognition and perception must occur.
CONCEPT ACQUISITION
The sharp distinction between cognition and perception, which
some critics of cognitive penetration theorize as a central
feature of the mind (see Firestone and Scholl, 2016), confronts
a particularly pressing problem at the heart of the cognitive
sciences: concept acquisition. In fact, the claim that such a strict
demarcation is an essential aspect of the nature of the mind
may even be empirically false (Kosslyn, 1980, 1994). For our
purposes, we will focus only on how the sharp demarcation
between cognition and perception generates problems for the
issue of concept acquisition. We aim to show that although the
pervasive cognitive penetration view cannot be true, as argued
above, the opposite view that claims that no cognitive penetration
ever occurs is also wrong. An important clarification is that
cognitive penetration can occur in late perception (after early
perceptual processing), and that preconceptual processes play
a major role in providing an interface between cognition and
perception at that level. Thus we defend the view that early
perception cannot be directly affected by cognition, but that there
is an interface that makes late (penetrable) perception possible
and, in fact, systematic. The main difficulty is to explain the
acquisition of perceptually based concepts that are critical for
basic recognition tasks.
Just as we need to be clear about the sense in which cognition
determines perception, we also need to be clear about what is
meant by ‘conceptual cognition.’ First, consider the distinctions
between memory, recognition, and seeing. Remembering is clearly
different from seeing and memory-based attentional effects.
Although memory may be crucial to guide perception and
categorize novel objects (e.g., Vlach, 2016), it does not determine
what we see. But why should conceptually based recognition
be on par with memory as a non-perceptual process? Take
for instance the evolutionarily crucial skill of recognizing kin
and enemies. This fundamental capacity seems to be part of
the perceptual system, and it seems to be the result of its
evolution (Millikan, 2005). Additionally, recognizing something
does not always require a full perception of it, since inferential
processing can use key features to inform the representation
based on memory, which indicates that recognitional abilities in
animals must be a combination of perceptual and preconceptual
capacities. Because of how basic these skills are for survival,
two forms of recognition could be postulated: one dependent
on memory and the other fundamentally perceptual (e.g., the
automatic reaction to sensory inputs). This possibility would not
be compatible with the sharp demarcation model (e.g., favored by
Firestone and Scholl, 2016), since recognitional capacities seem to
determine perceptual processing in such cases.
In what sense can preconceptual states that are not cognitively
penetrable lead to attention modulation that is cognitively
driven? As mentioned, one possibility is that conscious and
unconscious non-conceptual states overlap systematically with
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contents that can be described categorically by an organism
with conceptual capacities. Given the accuracy and reliability
of the mechanisms that produce such preconceptual states, one
could think of these states as a representational framework
that structures an interface for more abstract representations.
Language seems to be present only in humans, and as a matter
of methodology, it is best not to attribute conceptual capacities to
other species (Bermúdez, 2003, calls this a minimalist approach
to non-linguistic thought). Taking a minimalist approach is
fundamental to explain many navigational capacities that are
best understood either as measurement-based representations or
scenario contents. It would be inappropriate to characterize these
representations in terms of language, concepts, or linguistic-
propositional attitude psychology. Actually, some authors think
that even in the case of propositional attitude attribution
there are reasons to be skeptical about adopting a linguistic-
propositional model instead of a more minimalist one (Matthews,
2007).
The proposal mentioned previously, that access consciousness
may be responsible for cognitive penetration without causally
and directly changing the contents of early perception
(including phenomenally conscious perception), can now
be spelled out in more detail. Early processing is cognitively
impenetrable, intentional, and representational, and it can either
be phenomenally conscious (producing experiences of a sensorial
kind) or occur unconsciously—in accordance with CAD. These
early perceptual states have a content that can be characterized
as non-conceptual or non-propositional (for discussion of how
to characterize the representational nature of these states see
Montemayor, 2013). Then working memory and, in the case
of humans at least, conceptual representations, can influence,
guide, and indirectly determine the contents of perception at
later stages. Working memory processes can also help maintain
representations of task-relevant features by activating early
feature selection regions of the visual cortex (Serences et al.,
2009), which suggests a top-down influence on early vision
activations. In fact, various studies testing the memory for
sensory signals suggest that the circuitry underlying the working
memory involved in these tasks includes cortical areas that do
the processing of these signals (for a review, see Pasternak and
Greenlee, 2005). Nevertheless, such modulations of early vision
are consistent with the CAD approach. Also consistent with
CAD is the indirect guidance of late perception, which may
depend not only on access-conscious states with propositional
content, but also on other motivational and phenomenologically
powerful states, such as emotions. This is all consistent with early
perception being cognitively impenetrable. But the interface
between early and late perception shows that the interaction
between perception and cognition is vital for concept acquisition.
This clarification is important, because one way of interpreting
Firestone and Scholl’s (2016) proposal is that such an interface is
never possible and that there is no kind of cognitive penetration,
even at later perceptual stages.
As a cognitive phenomenon, concept acquisition seems to
critically depend on perceptual processes on some level. Fodor
(1983, 1998), who is a prominent proponent of the modular and
encapsulated architecture view that is putatively incompatible
with penetrability, explains concept acquisition as follows: “We
have the kinds of minds that often acquire the concept X from
experiences whose intentional objects are properties belonging
to the X-stereotype” (Fodor, 1998, pp.137–138; his emphasis).
These properties are not based on stored memories, otherwise
how could one even acquire a concept? What Fodor calls a
‘stereotype’ is not a judgment, but a statistical notion that captures
perceptual regularities (Fodor, 1998, p.138). Fodor insists that
perceptual experiences are necessary for concept acquisition.
If only judgments were necessary for this, how could one
acquire a perceptual concept in the first place? So conceptual
recognition seems to be an essentially perceptual process. Even
if one holds that concepts are innate, perceptual processes are
still necessary to acquire such concepts (obviously, for those who
deny innatism, perceptual processes suffice to explain concept
acquisition). Concept acquisition is neither explicit judgment
nor merely unconscious inference, and favoring a modular and
encapsulated architecture (e.g., Pylyshyn, 1999, 2003) can still be
compatible with having a conceptual interface between cognition
and perception.
Below, we draw a distinction between linguistic labels and
conceptual categories, which further clarifies the processes
underlying concept acquisition. First, we want to expand on
how the distinction between early and late perception relates
to traditional issues in epistemology. When you see a red cup,
seeing it as a cup that has the property of being red obviously
means that you possess the concepts ‘red’ and ‘cup.’ But your
perceptual system can be in a phenomenal state with the red cup
as part of its content, independently of these concepts (as it occurs
with infants, and presumably in other species). In other words,
your perceptual system can have a visual experience of the red
cup without seeing it as an object that falls under the category
‘red cup.’ For this reason, it seems that theories in cognitive
science must allow for the distinction between non-epistemic and
epistemic seeing (e.g., seeing a bundle of features versus seeing
something as an instance of a conceptual category).
Cases of expertise generate an interface not only with
concepts, but also with larger repertoires of judgments and
beliefs. Looking out your window, you see a bird land on a
nearby tree limb and you notice its gray and black colors. Your
expert friend, an ornithologist, sees not only the bird and its
colors, but also sees it as a hooded crow. This contrast can be
interpreted in several ways: you see an object and its colors, and
after attending to it carefully you see that it is a crow; or you see
a bird and while you see it as a crow, your expert friend sees it
as a hooded crow. In the latter case it seems clear that you and
your expert friend see the same bird (but see Siegel, 2010, for the
claim that these might be different perceptual experiences with
different contents). In the former case you see the bird and apply
the concept ‘crow.’ Other species may see the bird and be in a
perceptual state that disposes the animal to behave as if it were
referring to crows in particular, but without needing to be in a
conceptual or propositional state. You and your friend, however,
are accessing information differently even though the content
of your early perceptual experiences very likely overlap. This is
why access consciousness is associated with more complex forms
of cognitive integration that occur at later stages of perceptual
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processing. You posses the concept crow and bird, but only your
friend can draw the inference that this is a specific kind of crow.
Expertise (and/or prior experience) can change how we see
something conceptually, at the access consciousness level, but not
perceptually, at the early phenomenally conscious level. It can
affect perception at later perceptual stages, as when perceptual
contents are integrated with motivational states. Being an expert
might help you notice the nuanced details of a bird that enable
you to identify it as a certain species, compared to the naïve
observer that just sees it as some kind of bird (i.e., attention
to the detail might differ, though the same perceptual contents
are available to both observers). Expertise could provide a
form of pre-cueing effect. For example, by tuning the nervous
system to integrated contents, musicians are able to respond to
multisensory stimuli more efficiently (Landry and Champoux,
2017). These effects modulate or guide attention, rather than
determine what one perceives by affecting how information
is processed. Even in cases of sensory phenomena, such as
adaptation or negative after-images, changes in perception are
due to the unusual and consistent activation of visual neurons
(e.g., by forcing a constant fixation, a stimulus in the periphery
can disappear due to neural fatigue), and would not be considered
cases of cognitive penetration. In fact, these changes in adaptation
occur because gaze is directed in such a way as to induce
these phenomena, which are examples of how the modules of
perception can be directed in ways to exploit their inherent
characteristics, and not an example of cognition directly changing
the processing within the modules of early perception (see
Clifford et al., 2007). These adaptation effects occur at several
levels of perception that include late ones, as in the case of face
perception (Webster and MacLeod, 2011). It is the modulation
based on concepts and propositional content that is distinctly
characteristic of access consciousness, which according to CAD,
need not characterize phenomenal consciousness, including
subjectively experienced adaptation effects, thereby allowing for
the cognitive impenetrability of early perceptual states.
Concept acquisition begins with perceptual processes
that provide contents that need not be conceptualized to
be informative. Then later perceptual stages interface with
conceptual information and then store categorical information
into memory. Such interfaces are critical for conceptual
cognition. Of course, one can combine existing concepts to form
new ones independent of direct perception (e.g., a “Pegacorn”
can be easily imagined if one is familiar with Pegasus and
unicorns). Concept acquisition is a product of various processes,
some of which are purely perceptual and others purely cognitive,
and many that are a combination of the two. Partly because of
this, we believe that neither the absolute impenetrability nor the
pervasive penetrability views are entirely correct.
The CAD framework also allows for graded distinctions
that explain why, on the one hand, early perceptual processes
are so stable regardless of background beliefs and emotions,
and on the other hand, why highly integrated information is
susceptible to distortions based on beliefs and emotions at later
perceptual stages. This is a consequence of the argument from
evolution. Since intentionality evolved, an interface between
cognitively penetrable perception and cognitively impenetrable
perception must have evolved. The perception of magnitudes
offers a particularly interesting case. Perceptually represented
magnitudes for motor control and navigation (e.g., duration,
distance, or rate) differ from conscious attention to the duration
of sensations and emotions, including experienced effort. The
former are very reliable across species while the latter are
susceptible to well-confirmed distortion effects (Kahneman,
2000). Partly because of the difference in integration and
susceptibility to distortion effects, there are two models in
assessments of experience based on their duration or intensity:
the memory-based and moment-experience based models
(Kahneman, 2000, p. 692). This contrast between the early
perception of magnitudes and more recent interfaces between
perceptual magnitudes and conceptualized experiences has clear
implications for agency and planning, and it suggests that
different species must represent themselves in time differently
(Montemayor, 2010).
Perhaps among the evolutionarily oldest forms of early
perception is the perception of magnitudes for navigation.
Perceptual capacities for navigation are among the most
reliable skills that have been verified across species, including
insects (Gallistel, 1990). These perceptual capacities rely on
representations that are non-conceptual, and can be explained
in terms of scenario content (see also Montemayor, 2013, for
discussion of why these are representational). Conceptualized
emotions (and their duration and intensity), however, are
much more difficult to verify in other species and cannot be
assumed to be present in many of them (e.g., in insects that
can reliably navigate and attend to magnitudes). Presumably,
species with theory of mind capacities have a more complex
interface for perception, emotion, and cognition, as the
distinction between empathic and nociceptive pain shows. The
possibility for cognitive penetration correlates with evolutionary
history, as the argument from evolution entails, and also with
the cognitive integration required for accessing propositional
contents. The contrast between the perceived duration of
emotions and the more basic perception of magnitudes (e.g.,
time, distance, and rate) can easily be accommodated by the
CAD framework: there is an interface for the integration
between emotions and judgments concerning intensity and
value at much later stages of perception, but early perceptual
processing of magnitude perception is cognitively impenetrable.
This guarantees reliability, as mentioned before. In humans, there
is also a conceptual interface for the integration of perceptual
magnitudes and non-perceptual concepts, such as mathematical
concepts concerning space, time, and rate. This interface is
associated with access consciousness while the interface with
emotions is a combination of late conceptual perception and
the phenomenology of emotions. While some studies show that
magnitude judgments can be calibrated systematically (e.g., Izard
and Dehaene, 2008), these would be cases of modulating the
interpretation of the output rather than a cognitive penetration
of the magnitude estimation mechanism itself.
An interesting consequence of the argument from evolution in
the context of CAD is that competing views about concepts may
be correctly describing different levels of perceptual processing.
Conceptual structure of the kind humans have is more abstract
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than any set of features or simple perceptual attention routines—
it has a logical structure that allows for negation, valid inference,
and compositionality. Such concepts cannot be reduced to the
sums of the expected probabilities of features given a perceptual
scene, but the earliest, cognitively impenetrable stages may be
reducible to such feature or prototype-based analysis. This leads
to two further implications of the argument from evolution
concerning concepts in particular. First, the higher the degree of
cognitive integration and penetration, the more logical structure
is needed for cognitive influence. Second, the higher the degree
of inferential integration, the more abstract and amodal the
concepts are. This higher-level of cognitive integration is the one
typically associated with explicit judgment (i.e., explicit judgment
has logical structure). This opens the possibility for different types
of featured-based prototypes operating at early stages, and more
characteristically abstract conceptual representations playing
different roles at different interfaces, allowing for different
forms of integration and de-modularization at later perceptual
stages. These interfaces would be consistent with empirical
findings, such as the cross-species findings on the perception
of magnitudes and the findings on the distortion of duration
judgments regarding emotions in humans. Finally, one finds
a similar distinction between prototype-based categorization
and more abstract concepts in human development (e.g., Keil,
1989). Developmental studies indicate that infants can obtain
perceptual concepts before complex forms of abstract concepts
(Spelke, 1988; Spelke and Kinzler, 2007; Carey, 2009). It is
with this more advanced type of conceptual interface where we
could find cognitive penetrability, at later stages of perceptual
processing that are integrated with cognitively driven attention
modulation. These interfaces are, in the very least, evidence for
the interrelation between perception and cognition at later stages.
Thus, postulating different types of interfaces, based on the CAD
framework and the arguments from evolution, may help explain
cases of cognitive penetration at later stages while preserving the
cognitive impenetrability of early perception, striking a balance
between the prevailing opposite views.
CAD AS A FRAMEWORK OF
DISTINCTIONS FOR EMOTION,
PERCEPTION, AND JUDGMENT
Emotions complicate the picture considerably. They are an
important aspect of social cognition and interactions, particularly
in terms of developing empathy and helping to understand
others. For such reasons, emotional processing must be an
integral component of human perception and cognition. Newen
(2016), for instance, argues that emotions can be perceived
similar to the way perceptual features are perceived. Studies
suggest that emotions can be recognized in the same way
as pattern recognition in other sense modalities, driven by
evolutionary necessity and requiring an interaction of bottom-
up and top-down processes (see Newen, 2016). Similarly, socially
relevant information seems to be processed automatically, thus
calling into question whether perception should include attention
to social cues (Neufeld et al., 2016). If it is true that emotions
and socially relevant information are processed like perceptual
features, this view would strongly favor a very robust kind of
cognitive penetration because we not only see the basic perceptual
constancies that ground object- and feature-based attention, but
also emotional and socially relevant content. In other words,
if this view is correct, then emotional and social beliefs would
determine a substantial portion of perception. It is important to
notice that even if this were the case, it would still be compatible
with early perception being cognitively impenetrable.
The main problem, however, is that this example of
penetrability could simply mean guidance. There is good reason
to believe that the neural systems that support emotion overlap
with cognition (Pessoa, 2008), and emotional states may be
considered a form of pre-cueing. For example, an emotional
state, like fear, can bias how one directs attention (e.g., to
more threatening aspects of environment) and thus improve
interacting with the environment (LeDoux, 2012). This ability
also includes non-conscious perception of emotional stimuli (see
Tamietto and de Gelder, 2010). If these pre-cuing effects are
very robust and systematic, there is a very clear sense in which
they determine what one perceives, thus favoring some level of
penetrability at later stages of processing.
Just how powerful, exactly, can cognitive penetration be in
the case of emotions without being cognitively pernicious (e.g.,
by altering too much the contents of perception and rendering
crucial perceptual invariances unstable and unreliable)? CAD
also helps elucidate this issue. Emotions have an enormous
impact on conscious awareness, but this impact need not
be either fully perceptual or inferential. We believe this is a
significant source of confusion. Emotions have a significant
impact on an individual’s overall phenomenology, but having
too much impact on awareness can distract from or may even
suppress what one perceives. In such cases, the phenomenon
is one of interference or hindrance of perception rather than
a determination of perception (e.g., as with post-traumatic
stress disorder). In other cases it may enrich perception—
not by determining it, but by adding vivacity to the overall
phenomenological experience. Aesthetic experiences and the
vivacity of certain autobiographical memories are good examples
of this phenomenon (Montemayor and Haladjian, 2015, pp.150–
165). All these cases are best understood as late perceptual
cognitive penetration (perhaps motivational penetration is a
better term), rather than cognitive penetration of early perception
(for instance, early vision).
Color perception further elucidates the importance of CAD
to rigorously define cases of cognitive penetration at later stages
of perceptual processing from cognitively impenetrable early
vision. Color perception involves two distinct neural circuits,
one for color detection and another one related to circadian
regulation and emotion (Pauers et al., 2012). Do we perceive
emotions when we perceive color? This does not seem plausible.
Rather, we detect and experience color in early vision, and we
also experience a complex state of perceptual and emotional
contents at later stages of processing. Even in the case of
an individual’s memory of an object’s expected color, which
can influence the perceived color appearance of an object (see
Hansen et al., 2006), such findings do not conclusively indicate
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cognitive penetration of early visual perception, but rather the
stage that includes the interpretation of the signals from early
vision. To complicate things further, some aspects of feature-
detection may occur outside consciousness—they are mostly
independent in their neural correlates (Koch and Tsuchiya,
2012). Priming of color can occur at higher levels of processing
even without conscious perception of the color, as in studies
that use backward masking to test priming of responses to
colors that are not consciously seen (Norman et al., 2014). To
accommodate this fact we need a graded framework like CAD
rather than a sharp distinction between cognition and perception
or a pervasive form of cognitive penetration. Color detection and
color-based emotions do interact systematically at the later stages
of perceptual processing that are also phenomenally conscious,
but this does not entail that emotion penetrates color detection
or early visual color experiences.
Regarding the cases of automatic social detection (e.g.,
Neufeld et al., 2016), these could be similar to detection
patterns associated with social planning routines that operate
independently of experienced emotions and feelings. Thus, based
on CAD, it is not so easy to say that emotion is detected as
part of perception, because such routines could be modeled
either as unconscious processing or as specific attention routines
triggered by specific perceptual conceptualized contents, rather
than being constitutive of early perception, since this detection
is not altered by overall phenomenology (a point entirely
analogous to the distinction between magnitudes and emotion
intensity mentioned above). Generally, it may be that such
pattern detection of social cues would not entail systematic
penetrability because they may actually occur at late levels of
cognitive processing or not be perceptual at all (e.g., they could
be inferential or strictly mnemonic).
The CAD framework can explain many changes in perception
at later stages while justifying the impenetrability of early
perception. Merely appealing to phenomenology and how
switching from one attention task to another vary what one
experiences does not suffice to prove penetrability precisely
because of the distinctions based on the levels of CAD.
Moreover, even the phenomenology of perception favors
stability and continuity in experience, rather than variability
caused by constant cognitive penetration. For example, as
one moves around a room, the experienced color and shape
constancies of the walls and furniture remain the same
despite the many inferential triggers, actual and potential,
that one has at any single moment. Strikingly, this also
seems to be the case in dreams where there is a generally
coherent experience, no matter how absurd it may be.
Therefore, appeals to conscious experience may not provide
decisive evidence for cognitive penetration because overall
phenomenology depends on cognitive integration at late stages
of perceptual processing in a way that is compatible with
early perceptual impenetrability. What one needs to show in
order to verify radical and pervasive cognitive penetration is
that cognition determines perception at an essential level, at
the earliest stages, causing changes in perception in a direct
way. CAD shows that the evidence can be understood in a
way that avoids this interpretation because CAD demonstrates
that cognition and perception can be independent and yet
interact in systematic ways. In particular, concept acquisition
of basic perceptual categories is a good place to identify clear
cases of cognitive penetration beyond the initial stages of early
perception.
COGNITIVELY DRIVEN ATTENTION:
FEATURE-BASED, SYNTACTIC, AND
SEMANTIC
It is important to restate why resisting pervasive cognitive
penetration is not only plausible because of the argument from
evolution, but also as a general theoretical commitment. One
reason is the problem of the impossibility of common ground
among perceivers. If there is no common ground, how can
one explain reliable coordination among multiple subjects for
motor control and attentional tasks (e.g., that are executed
when playing team sports)? One solution, offered by CAD, is
that while there are significant levels of cognitive penetration
at highly integrated levels of cognition and perception, there
is no cognitive penetration at early conscious and unconscious
perception. But it is also important to explain how exactly top-
level processes influence perceptual experience. This is what CAD
allows for: cognitive impenetrability of early processing with rich
influence from cognition at higher levels of cognitive integration
(e.g., attention to the intensity of emotions, or the importance
of an autobiographical memory), which correspond to more
evolutionary recent types of attention (for a criticism against the
view that top-down pathways entail cognitive penetration, see
Raftopoulos, 2001a,b).
There are several possible areas of higher-level cognition
that could be susceptible to cognitive penetration. According
to CAD, phenomenal consciousness varies systematically
with emotional and background knowledge contents—it is
empathically structured (Montemayor and Haladjian, 2015).
How susceptible the more semantic aspects of the mind are to
inference and emotional influence may depend on the concepts
a species has and the degree of information integration—
hence the importance of concept acquisition. To repeat, early
perception is cognitively impenetrable, which allows for reliable
and predictable motor control and coordination with external
objects. These contents are processed independently of the
empathic and integrative influences of cognition and emotion.
This structural requirement is related to adaptive necessity, and
likely appeared in other species that are evolutionarily close to
humans (Zentall, 2005). Furthermore, human-like conscious
awareness seems dependent on a global functional connectivity
among brain modules (Wu, 2014; Godwin et al., 2015), and this
may indicate a form of penetrability at later, more integrated
stages of perception.
At the early stages, perceptual features are processed
independently, with minimal top-down modulation, in order
to reliably and accurately structure the perceptual scenes (e.g.,
auditory or visual scenes). This representational scaffolding
supports later cognitive guidance and can be characterized
as scenario content or preconceptual sensorial representation.
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Then, at later stages that likely depend on the intervention
of working memory, feature based-attention can be guided
and oriented by cognitively driven forms of attention that
highlight some perceptual features and suppress or inhibit
others based on cognitive and motivational information. Some
of these cognitively driven types of attention likely evolved
at different times. Some of them modulate detection; others
exclusively concern conceptual information and can only be
found without controversy in humans. The range of influence
of cognition on perception is quite vast and it increases
with the degree of cognitive integration, characteristic of
late perceptual processing. According to CAD, there is a
type of attention at late stages of integration that is fully
independent of specific perceptual experiences and that is
exclusively driven toward access to propositional contents. We
have argued that this kind of cognitively driven attention
plays an important role in specifying the contents of late
perception, but that it cannot directly change early perception,
including the perceptual experiences associated with early stages
of perception.
The consciousness and attention dissociation also helps
address the previously mentioned difficulty that perception
may occur outside consciousness, independently of whether
or not the contents of perception are susceptible to cognitive
penetration. Consider the result by Vishton et al. (2007)
concerning the Ebbinghaus illusion, in which the instruction
to grasp the stimulus reduces the illusion. This effect of a
reduction in the illusion was found in previous studies where
acting on a stimulus producing an illusion indicated a more
accurate internal representation than what was consciously
perceived. That is, while the phenomenology of perception is
tricked by an illusion (e.g., the Müller-Lyer illusion), perception
for action is not (Stöttinger and Perner, 2006). Also, this
kind of performance can be affected by emotional states
(van Ulzen et al., 2008), which indicates that emotion can
influence conscious experience, but only at a higher level of
integration and processing, as the argument from evolution
entails. Similarly, desiring something might affect how it is
consciously perceived; for example, an appealing location might
seem closer than an unappealing one that is at the same
physical distance from the observer (Alter and Balcetis, 2011).
Such studies are examples of how conscious perceptions may
be affected by certain mental states, and that there can be a
dissociation between the information that enters awareness and
the unconscious information used for other perceptual processes.
It is unlikely, however, that these effects could influence the
perceptual-navigational system (e.g., the system we use to
walk across a room), or the experiences produced by early
perception.
Another example of how feature detection in conscious
perception can differ from that used to execute motor actions
is seen in an experiment investigating the double-drift illusion.
This illusion occurs when an object moves in the periphery
of the visual field along a specific trajectory, but because the
object has a texture that moves orthogonal to this trajectory, the
overall perceived movement of the object does not correspond to
the veridical path. In other words, an illusory path is perceived
because of the combination of motion information from the
internal motion of the object as well as its actual trajectory.
In a recent study by Lisi and Cavanagh (2015), participants
were asked to make an eye movement to one of these moving
objects (that disappeared as soon as the eye movement began),
and they found that the eyes landed closer to the veridical path
as opposed to the perceived illusory path. This suggests that
the information sent to the motor system is not susceptible to
the illusion, since the motor system can execute correct eye
movements, even though the illusion is consciously perceived.
An implication of these results is that unconscious perception
can be highly accurate as well as integrated with cognitive-driven
goals.
The CAD framework also allows for a more useful distinction
that can potentially clarify ambiguities. Consider Kravitz and
Behrmann’s (2011) finding concerning facilitation by a concept:
faster response times to detect ‘h’ based on prior exposure
to ‘H.’ This kind of cognitively driven attention to syntactic
features should not be considered cognitive penetration. For
similar reasons, semantic priming should also be considered an
attentional effect that is cognitively driven and that occurs at
later stages of processing. In the evolution of the visual and
other perceptual systems, it is likely that feature-based attention
and basic forms of object-based attention evolved first, and
only later can one find complex forms of semantically driven
attention to features relevant to expertise and propositional
contents (see Haladjian and Montemayor, 2015). Attention
based on propositional content is, therefore, a kind of cognitive
guidance that must occur at later stages of perceptual processing
and which must have evolved more recently. This kind of
cognitive guidance at later stages can influence inference,
memory, object recognition, and concept categorization. In the
case of human cognition and perception, this kind of cognitively
driven attention to semantic contents is the most important
component that facilitates a powerful interface between cognition
and perception, and it provides the basic scaffolding for concept
acquisition of all kinds. As mentioned before, concept acquisition
allows for many kinds of cognitive penetration at later stages
of processing, and it is fundamental to understand human
perception.
There is yet another, and perhaps even more recent, kind
of cognitively driven attention that modulates late perceptual
contents: attention to syntactically structured perceptual
patterns. The complex hierarchical structure of human language
must be somehow perceived. The question is exactly how. If
Berwick and Chomsky (2016) are right, the capacity to detect
syntactic patterns evolved quite recently in our species. In
fact, if it is true that the capacity to articulate and combine
strings of symbols hierarchically is as recent as 200,000 to
150,000 years ago (Berwick and Chomsky, 2016, p. 54, indicate
that it is only 60,000 years ago that it certainly emerged),
then it must be one of the most recent events in our cognitive
evolution. While syntax processing has a very significant
impact on human cognition, it need not operate by constantly
influencing what we perceive (unlike conceptually based
late perception, which is essential for epistemic seeing and
epistemic perception more generally). Rather, it may operate
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in the way motor control operates: in a highly automatic
and reliable fashion that cannot be made explicit through
discursive judgment and which processes information beyond
conscious access. If so, even in spite of its very recent evolution,
syntax processing may not provide a robust interface for
cognition and perception, and interesting cases of cognitive
penetration at late perceptual stages may be limited to semantic
processing. This is an issue that needs to be studied in more
detail.
This brings us to the last point we want to make. The
fact that perception is stable and invariant at the early stages
supports not only our cognitive systems but also motor control
and action. Early perception plays the critical role of making
this possible, by not allowing direct casual influences from
cognition or emotion on the processing of the most basic stages
of perceptual scene structuring. Basic perceptual experiences
are also stable in this way and, moreover, they are experienced
in a way that does not necessitate conceptual or propositional
guidance. Conscious access to contents, on the other hand, likely
requires a high level of integration of information within the
brain, which is the argument made by global workspace theories
of consciousness (e.g., Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Baars,
2005), with increased functional connectivity among different
neural modules (rather than within modules) being associated
with such conscious awareness (Godwin et al., 2015). Cognitive
penetration is likely to be found at these later stages of perceptual
processing, and crucially, at the interface between early contents
and different forms of concept formation. A further question
is the extent to which empathic and motivational effects
guide late perception. With the rich conceptual framework of
human cognition, the interface between emotion, cognition, and
perception allows for many kinds of cognitive penetration at
these later stages of processing. Semantic and syntactic guidance
through cognitively driven attention is a critical part of this
process.
Acquiring concepts does not directly affect how features
are detected at the earliest level, but they do determine what
we epistemically perceive (e.g., as a member of a category).
Having a specific concept is not as urgent as responding to
a feature essential for survival, but basic categorization, even
if it is of a preconceptual kind, can help in urgent situations,
as the alarm calls of some animals show. It can also lead to
complex forms of planning, mental travel, and even theory of
mind, as the quasi-conceptual capacities of birds demonstrate.
Fully fledged concepts, as found in humans, lead to a cognitive
framework that allows not only for epistemic seeing, but
also for inferential judgment (including discursive inference),
and epistemic justification. Based on CAD and the argument
from evolution, it is useful to think of these capacities as
falling under different levels of cognitive integration at higher-
levels of perceptual information processing. To reiterate, this
is all compatible with the cognitive impenetrability of early
perception.
Thus, CAD helps clarify how the fact that perception is
deeply related to cognition and emotion is compatible with
the cognitive impenetrability of early perceptual processing.
Conceptual interfaces are at the center of the relation between
cognition and emotion. These conceptual interfaces manifest
in forms of perceptual pre-cuing, biases, modulation, and
guidance through the mechanism of cognitively driven attention.
These interfaces also provide the framework for the type of
consciousness associated with access to propositional contents,
which according to CAD, is dissociated from the experiences
produced by early phenomenally conscious perception. Early
perception guarantees stability and reliability, as well as
a perceptual common ground with other organisms. Late
perceptual processing provides a rich framework of possibilities
that enrich perception in many ways. Finally, semantic and
syntactic influences in late perception increase these possibilities
in ways that cannot be found in any other species, and
makes human perception the rich manifold of contents that
make possible the very complex behavior that characterizes
humanity.
CONCLUSION
How the world appears to us can depend largely on our
expectations, beliefs, and desires. The debate on cognitive
penetration has explored this issue in the last few decades from
different perspectives, particularly those concerning cognitive
architecture and semantic content. The conclusion many authors
reach is that cognitive penetration is either largely pervasive or
inexistent. We argue that a more nuanced perspective is required.
The CAD framework allows for such a perspective, informed
by findings from the research on consciousness and attention,
and their evolution. More specifically, CAD helps explain why
although there may be many cases of cognitive penetration in late
perception, early perception must be cognitively impenetrable.
With the CAD framework, a more balanced approach to
cognitive penetration is feasible. An interesting question is: could
a similar balance be achieved without it? We cannot explore this
issue in detail here, but we believe that at the very least, CAD is
the best way to achieve this balance. It may be the only way to
achieve such a balance in a rigorous way, but we will not argue
for this stronger claim here. However, we leave this consideration
in favor of CAD: the evidence, including evolution, does not
support as strongly an interface without CAD. For instance, such
an interface could concern only unconscious processing (e.g.,
constituted by Helmholtzian inferential abilities). Alternatively,
this interface could involve exclusively conscious information,
requiring subjectively experienced integration for any perceptual
process. The evidence indicates that neither of these options
is likely true. Thus, the interface between cognition and
perception seems to be fundamentally structured in terms
of CAD.
Given the implications of CAD and the argument from
evolution, we argued that concept acquisition is a particularly
important topic with respect to cognitive penetration, with
ramifications for the integration of emotions, inferential
reasoning, and recognitional processes. Perception and cognition
may be largely independent, and they are fully independent at
early stages, but there are systematic ways in which they interact.
The more cognitive integration there is, the more cognitive
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penetration one finds. Perhaps, as suggested above, there may
even be more than one interface for cognitive penetration because
there are many kinds of cognitive modulation in late perception.
Yet despite this systematic interaction between cognition and
perception at such late stages, cognitive penetration is not
pervasive.
Besides providing positive suggestions for addressing the
problem of penetrability in a more thorough theoretical way, this
paper also raises challenging questions. What kind of conceptual
or epistemic capacities underlie different forms of penetrability?
Which capacities necessitate cognitive penetration? How can one
verify such capacities across different species? How is it possible
to integrate the findings on consciousness and attention, as well
as their dissociation, in a way that addresses the problem of
cognitive penetration? The findings on animal cognition and
future research on how our own capacities compare to those
of other species, particularly in the development of semantic
and conceptual guidance, is fertile ground for exploration.
The argument from evolution, especially as it concerns the
development of different forms of intentionality, should help
guide future investigations in this area.
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